A Look at Power, from Federalist 66-77 and Cato V*

The central theme of this set of papers is power. Particularly presidential power and the checks granted through institutional mechanisms. Federalist 67 reveals the power of appointments and the filling of vacancies in the Senate. Hamilton is quick to point out that these appointments will be temporary. Federalist 68 addresses the electors and the election of the president and reveals, “the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.” (413) This good administration is produced through the Electoral College. Federalist 69 refers to the character of the president. The position of ‘chief magistrate’ will include the following: 4 year term, liable to be impeached, veto power, commander and chief, pardons, legislative adjournment, treaties, receiving ambassadors and nomination of ambassadors. In this list Hamilton states that the power of the president would be equivalent to that of a governor. Federalist 70 informs us of the problem with having a feeble president. For, “the ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are unity; duration, an adequate provision for its support and competent powers.” (422) This can only occur with one person. If more than one person holds the office then vagueness and ambiguity will reign. Federalist 71 adheres to the logic of term length in office for the president. “A duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition … it is not long enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty.” (433) Federalist 72 reveals the need for the president to have the right of reelection, for “to continue him in the station in order to prolong virtues and to secure to the government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration.” (435) If not then this will “depriv(e) the community of the advantage of the experience gained.” (437) Federalist 73 narrows the focus of power on the right of the president to use the veto stipulation in the constitution. Hamilton views this power necessary for “additional security against the enaction of improper laws.” (441) Federalist 74 centers the discussion on the president as commander and chief. This power will be tempered by “the reflection that the fate of a fellow – creature depended on his sole fiat would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution.” (446) Federalist 75 expounds the international nature of the presidential powers and focuses on treaty power. Hamilton sees “the management of foreign negotiations point out the executive as the most fit agent in those transactions.” (449) Furthermore a check in this power would be seen in the Senate. For, “the joint possession of the power in question, by the President and Senate would afford a greater prospect of security than the separate possession of it by either of them.” (451) Federalist 76 reveals the need for appointments to be vested in one man. For, “one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superiors discernment.” (454) Federalist 77 furthers the discussion of appointments and reveals the need for singular control of appoints for public accountability. So that, “the blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely.” (459)

Cato V is a decisive account, in Hobbiesan ilk, that presidential power should not be granted to one man. More importantly the powers in the constitution are, “vague and inexpert” which can lead to malcontent and down right deception by the executive. (317) Moreover this scenario could potentially, “lead to oppression and ruin.” (317) Furthering this attack is the notion of the Electoral College. Cato reveals that the people do not elect the President and this will create an immeasurable distance between the chief magistrate and the people. Finally, Cato gives a historical reflection of tyrants and states that “Americans are like other men in similar situations” referring to the notion of absolute power will corrupt absolutely. (319)

*All sited work is from the following two works:

• The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates by Ralph Ketcham (Introduction) signet classic
  

• The Federalist Papers (Paperback) by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, Clinton Rossiter, Charles R. Kesler (Editor) signet classic