Part I: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Saudi Arabian Dilemma

Part I: Pakistan

Focusing on issues such as: nuclear non-proliferation, rouge scientists, madress reform and presidential politics in the sub-continent of Asia are tricky to cultivate and even more complicated to comprehend. These issues, however, are the most imperative foreign policy and national security concerns of the day. Moreover, I believe, that these issues are front and center on decreasing the ability of terrorists and creating a global environment where extreme groups are unable to utilize WMDs.

Concentrating on these topics were a panel of two policy advisors and a congressman during the 9/11 Public Discourse Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center (8/2/05). Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton (D- Ind.) was joined by Former Ambassador Dennis Ross and Former Ambassador A. Elizabeth Jones. Dennis Ross formerly worked for the Clinton administration as special Middle East coordinator and Ambassador Jones worked with Kazakhstan from 1995-1998. Each brought insight and empirical understanding about issues ranging from nuclear proliferation, Islamic fundamentalism, and most significantly how the US can create behavioral change among leading actors/states within the sub-continent of Asia.

The first portion of their discussion centered on Pakistan. Amb. Jones revealed that President Musharraf has an incredible balancing act between Islamic forces within and secular pressures from outside the country. He must “control the country”. This control however is easier said then done. In fact, the mere threat or sign of outside pressure can have detrimental effects on his Presidency. Moreover, all decisions made by Musharraf must be placed within the prism of India. In fact, the “Taliban, Afghanistan, and the Northwest Province all are in the backdrop (of) India, Kashmir and nuclear issues”. Moreover, the nuclear issue has, “create(ed) a sense of self” for each nation. I found this to be the most telling aspect of her analysis. In other words, a nuclear weapon has created a new sense of worth, prestige and nationalism. This is not new. Russia, China, England, France and more recently Israel have all reinvented themselves out of the nuclear cocoon. For example, if the nuclear weapon was absent from the French arsenal then they would also be absent from the Security Council of the UN. In light, of this new “sense of self” in geopolitics, one must also understand how pressures should be applied and recommended, to enact behavioral change for such a “nuclear power”.

Amb. Dennis Ross states “keeping public pressure” is important but the pressure must “have real consequences when private demands have not been met”. He also reviews the track record of Musharraf as a strategic ally in the region. However, Musharraf is a self-preserving individual and only uses decisive measures when all eyes are watching. For example, if the international public eye is somewhere else he is inclined to be ambivalent to threats from extremist groups. In the words of Ross, Musharraf has been “episodic and not systemic in his approach to threats”. A clear and I dare say gravest example of this episodic and dangerous form of control is the case of Dr. A.Q. Khan.

Khan, a rouge scientist and a former member of the Pakistani intelligence services, has been credited with giving nuclear secrets to such states as Libya and Iran. Furthermore, the jury is still out on whether other countries have had the pleasure of a visit from the good doctor. What makes this situation more perilous is the inability of the US to question or confer with Dr. Khan about his international transactions. The road block is Musharraf. Thus, a clear dilemma appears:

• Musharraf must hold power
• Musharraf's power is in the interst of the US
• Forces within the country act counter to the interests of Pakistan and the US
• To keep power Musharraf must abide by these forces.

So how do we exert pressure on Musharraf?

Both Jones and Ross believe in “positive aggressive pressure” and educational reform. Reform must be within the secondary, primary and military arenas, these are long term solutions. In the short run, Jones feels that private talks must be made and ‘public positivism’ must be shown to further US interests in the region. Ross adds an addendum to this course of action, where public consequences are suffered if private consultations do not come to fruition. I am inclined to agree with Ross and also further the public scrutiny of Pakistan. Pakistan can not disappear from the international radar. Concurrently, this region can not be forgotten, for an Islamic nuclear caliphate will surly overshadow any threat from Al Qaeda, unless they are one in the same.