The Patriot Act a Red Herring?

As more information comes to light about national security intelligence prior to 9/11 it seems quite irrational to have created a new bureaucracy in the hopes of solving a problem which was already identified. In today’s New York Times, an article of significance has come to light which underscores the ability of pre-9/11 intelligence to identify and locate terrorists. Apparently, a high level military team known as Able Danger had, “in the summer of 2000 … prepared a chart that included visa photographs of the four men (Mohammed Atta and three other future hijackers) and recommended to the military's Special Operations Command that the information be shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the congressman, Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, and (a) former intelligence official said Monday.”

This can be seen as a lie or a liberal rouse to damage the President and his national security team before the attacks; however the point is that the intelligence services had creditable evidence BEFORE the attacks. In other words, the intelligence services were working, just not acted upon. This is a critical challenge to the 9/11 commission findings that it was an internal problem between CIA and FBI intelligence services and their inability to communicate with one another. The fact still remains that the information was clear and actionable. Thus a failure to act is not justification for a new federal bureaucracy (Dept. of Homeland Security) or new and obtrusive legislation, namely the US Patriot Act.

Furthermore, any new bureaucracy must have time to formulate policy and new chains of command. Thus enabling the mission to be completed, specifically the safety of America. In all likelihood this will take time; which is in short supply when dealing with terrorists whom have privatized the means of warfare.

Lastly, my inclination is that this report is just a fragment of intelligence which could have been acted upon. The point being, once again, that our intelligence services were in working order before 9/11, (granted not perfectly but quite effectively, retooling the mechanism would be have been a much more prudent coarse of action) unfortunately a convoluted and bulky bureaucratic apparatus has never brought about valid, necessary or timely adjustments in the federal government. Instead, such changes have increased expenditures, earmarks and consequently disabled the ability of agents to retrieve much needed intelligence. One step forward and two steps back, unfortunately this isn’t an experiment in social programs; it is an experiment with national security.